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Abstract 
The paper describes and analyses fiscal operations at the local level in order to improve 
understanding of fiscal federalism in Nigeria. The paper also tries to ascertain whether 
fiscal imbalances observed at both federal and state arms of government also exist at the 
local government level. The study is based on an analysis of primary data derived from 
administered questionnaires to randomly selected local governments. The results show 
that some local governments experienced surpluses during the period of structural ad-
justment. Deficits were financed through guaranteed state loans, state grants and com-
mercial bank loans. The paper suggests that local government financial behaviour should 
be monitored in order to ensure accountability and financial discipline. 
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I. Introduction 
The severity of Nigeria's economic crisis dictates that all available resources be effectively 
mobilized to reverse the deterioration of the economy. In recent times, local governments 
in Nigeria have been assigned specific development roles by the constitution. But this 
should not be taken to suggest that in the past local governments did not contribute to 
economic development. For example, between 1955 and 1965, local governments were 
responsible for an average of 12% of total public expenditure in the country. 
In a federal system like Nigeria, local governments are close to the people and hence 
could effectively alter socioeconomic and political conditions within their jurisdictions. 
Apart from providing and maintaining basic infrastructures, local governments can 
complement the economic activities of other levels of government. The activities of the 
National Directorate of Employment, for example, or the back-to-land programmes that 
are agriculturally based, can have more positive impact at the grassroots level by working 
with local governments. 
Fiscal operations at the local government (LG) level become significant if 
macroeconomic stability is necessary in the wider economy. If fiscal imbalance appears 
rampant at the local level, it could pose problems for macroeconomic management of 
the economy. The scenario is even more complex when local governments depend on 
transfers from the centre. In this era of structural adjustment, local governments face 
more challenges in terms of struggling to be less dependent on the centre and the state 
for financial resources. 
Though the revenue allocation system mandates that a certain fraction of the federation 
account be allocated to local governments, these funds are never enough to meet 
expenditure requirements. This is so because the size of the account is related to revenue 
from oil, which is subject to fluctuations, and the expectations of local governments far 
exceed the available resources. In a system characterized by ethnic and clan conflicts, 
state governments have attempted for political reasons to frustrate the existence and 
effectiveness of local governments. Our results indicate that most state governments 
defaulted on their statutory allocations to local governments, rendering local governments 
financially and politically impotent. The Local Government Reform of 1976 notes: 
Local governments have over the years suffered from the continued whittling 
down of their powers, and state governments had continued to encroach upon 
what would normally have been the exclusive preserves of local governments and 
consequently there has been a divorce between the people and government at 
their most basic levels. 
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Fortunately, the picture is now different since the functions of local governments, 
sources of revenues and other responsibilities have constitutional backing. 
Our previous study (Ekpo and Ndebbio, 1991) not only traced the evolution of fiscal 
federalism within the Nigerian economy but also concentrated on the fiscal relationship 
between the federal and state governments. There also exists an economic relationship 
between the government at the centre and the local government. Similar relationships 
exist between the state and local governments. An examination of local government fiscal 
operations becomes very important for a complete understanding of fiscal federalism. In 
order to appreciate how, for example, total grants to local governments compare with 
states' deficits, it is crucial to examine this study side by side with our previous work 
(Ekpo and Ndebbio, 1991). This way, performance between state and local governments 
can be compared. 
The local government system in the country has had a chequered history. The system 
started being modernized in the early 1950s, but the nature and character of local 
government reforms varied from region to region. At present, there are 589 local 
governments in the country. Before 27 August 1991, the number of local governments 
stood at 453. The creation of more local governments has been politically motivated, as 
most local governments are not viable. It appears that the agitation for more local 
governments is based on the desire to share from the federation account controlled by 
the centre. Most of the local governments studied do not have enough natural and human 
resources to survive on their own; they depend on statutory allocations. 
The objective of this study is to describe and analyse fiscal operations at the local 
level in order to incorporate this third tier of government into our previous work on fiscal 
federalism. The extent of self-financing, the fiscal gap and its volatility at the local level 
will also be examined. It is anticipated that a study of this nature will contribute to the 
existing literature on fiscal federalism in developing economies 
II. Evolution of local government 
administration 
The local government system in Nigeria has experienced several reforms since the early 
1950s. During that period, the system was modernized and constituted on a representative 
basis. Colonial local administration revolved around traditional rulers, with the unit of 
local administration referred to as the native authority. Executive authority lay with the 
district officer. The authorities at that time created administrative organizations that were 
ad hoc in nature. However, some success of this type of administration was noticeable in 
the centralized emirates of the former Northern Nigeria. 
The evolution of local government administration in the country must be seen in the 
context of regionalism. The old regions of the East, West and North, as a result of 
different levels of development traversed different paths to strengthen their systems of 
local administration. An analysis of the evolution of local government administration 
prior to the major 1976 local government reforms is in NCEMA (1990) and Gboyega 
(1983). 
The 1976 reform represented a fundamental change in the development of local 
government in Nigeria. For the first time, the country was given a common, single-tier 
structure of local government in place of the different structures of various states. Our 
interest in the 1976 reform hinges on the restructuring of the financial system. The 
reforms instituted statutory allocations of revenues from the federation account with the 
intention of giving local governments fixed proportions of both the federation account 
and each state's revenue. This mandatory allocation was entrenched in the 
recommendations of the Aboyade Revenue Commission of 1977. The 1979 constitution 
empowered the National Assembly to determine what proportion of the federation account 
and a state's revenue should be allocated to local governments. In 1981, the National 
Assembly fixed these proportions at 10% of the federation account and 10% of the total 
revenue of the state. In 1985, the States' proportion was reduced to 10% of internal 
revenue. Local governments allocation from the federation account was later amended 
to 20%. At present, statutory allocation to local governments stands at 25% of the 
federation account, reflecting the larger development role local governments are expected 
to play. 
These changes were due to the 1976 local government reforms, which also stated that 
the internal revenue sources of local governments would include: 
• Rates, which include property rates, education rates and street lighting 
• Taxes such as community, flat rate and poll tax 
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• Fines and fees, which include court fines and fees, motor park fees, forest fees, public 
advertisement fees, market fees, regulated premises fees, registration of births and 
deaths and licensing fees 
• Miscellaneous sources such as rents on council estates, royalties, interests on 
investments and proceeds from commercial activities. 
This clear delineation of revenue sources was to avoid the usual encroachment on 
local government sources of revenue by states. 
III. Conceptual framework 
The conceptual and theoretical issues involved in intergovernment fiscal relations are 
fully discussed in Ekpo and Ndebbio( 1991) and Shah (1991). However, it is necessary 
to re-emphasize that local government fiscal operations can play an important role in 
macro-management of the economy. At the local level, certain goods and services are 
best provided through public means. Hence, issues of efficiency, resource allocation and 
distribution become relevant at the third level of government. In addition, it is generally 
agreed that certain taxes, levies and rates are better collected by local governments. 
Expenditure made at the local level may not only be centrally financed, but also 
centrally directed. Local governments that act as central expenditure agents do not reflect 
expenditure decentralization in a meaningful sense, just as centrally collected but shared 
taxes do not imply proper revenue centralization (Musgrave, 1973: 342). It is, therefore, 
important to distinguish various types of grants and transfers reflecting the extent to 
which central control of expenditures and revenues is involved. Centralization could be 
measured between various tiers of governments. It is possible that within an economy 
decentralization may take place between the federal and state governments while relative 
centralization remains at the local government level. The converse can also occur. 
There are several issues on the economics of intergovernment transfers. 
Intergovernment transfers can be generally classified as either non-matching or selective 
matching. Non-matching funds may be selective or general (conditional or 
nonconditional). In terms of selective nonmatching transfers, the government at the 
centre, for example, provides a specific amount of funds to another tier and expects the 
latter to match the funds. Such funds are often for a specific purpose. 
Selective non-matching grants are best suited as a means of subsiding activities to 
which the higher level government (say the Federal Government) assigns a high 
priority by Local governments. Such a case would occur in a degree of spillovers 
up to some level of provision after which the external benefits abruptly terminate 
(Shah, 1991: 22). 
For non-matching unconditional or general grants, no constraints are imposed on 
how the funds are to be spent. Selective matching grants, on the other hand, must be 
spent for a particular purpose and the recipient is required to match the funds to some 
degree. These grants are otherwise known as cost-sharing programmes. 
There are economic, political and social justifications for transfers. These reasons are 
covered in Boadway (1990), and Shah (1983). Economic justifications for grants include 
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efficiency, equity and stabilization objectives. Within the theory of grants, efficiency 
and equity objectives are complementary. Boadway (1990) maintains that application of 
efficiency and equity principles suggests four main economic reasons for grants. These 
are: 
® Interjurisdictional spillovers - implying that intergovernment transfers can be used 
to increase the efficiency with which public goods and services are provided. 
• Fiscal gap - involving "a mismatch between means and expenditure needs at various 
levels". This results in a structural imbalance bringing about a shortfall in revenue 
for a lower level of government. Fiscal gap or imbalance could be due to: 
(a) inappropriate expenditure and tax assignment; 
(b) limited and/or unproductive tax bases available to a lower tier of government; 
(c) tax competition between tiers of government; or 
(d) the centre crowding out tax room for state and local governments. 
• Minimum standards of services - connoting efficiency as well as equity criteria for 
ensuring common minimum standards across an economy especially in a federation. 
• Differential net fiscal benefits across states - occurring because some states are better 
endowed than others with natural resources and thus have better access to an enlarged 
revenue base. 
Furthermore, some states could have higher incomes, hence a greater ability to raise 
revenues from existing bases compared with others. Stabilization grants can increase in 
periods of slack economic activity to encourage local expenditure and curtail spending 
during the upswing of the business cycle. 
IV. Scope and methodology 
This study covers 17 local governments in the former 21-state structure. Within 10 
states, the local governments were designated as either urban or rural. This categorization 
is derived from official publications. The 10 states (Bendel, Cross River, Lagos, Kano, 
Ogun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Imo and Sokoto) were selected from our previous study to 
capture a broad geographical spread. The sampled states and local governments are 
presented in Table 1. Data were collected essentially by the use of designed questionnaires. 
For most of the local governments sampled so far, data appeared consistent for the period 
1980-1991. Thus, for an analysis of specific local governments, we have concentrated on 
1980-1991. However, our analysis in certain areas spans from 1976 to 1991. 
Problems were encountered in data collection. Apart from the paucity of data existing 
at the local level, officials were rather reluctant to express their views on how fiscal gaps 
(deficit) were financed. In areas where published data were available, there was also 
some reluctance in completing the questionnaires. The present report examines data from 
13 local government areas. Data f rom the remaining four local governments appear scanty, 
hence our decision to exclude them from our analysis. Efforts were made to ensure that 
data were consistent and reliable through various visits and cross-checking with published 
data where available as well as with official documents. It is important to state that the 
data may exhibit some problems, hence a critique of this work must take into account the 
nature of the data. 
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Tab le 1 : S a m p l e d s ta tes a n d local g o v e r n m e n t s s ta tus 
States Local governments Status 
Anambra Enugu* Urban 
Uzo-Uwani Rural 
Bendel Oredo Urban 
Okpebho Rural 
Cross River Calabar* Urban 
Akampka Rural 
Lagos Ikeja* Urban 
Mushin Semi-urban 
Kano Bichi Urban 
Ogun Ijebu-North Urban 
Odeda Rural 
Oyo Ibadan* Urban 
Ejigbo Rural 
Plateau Bassa Rural 
Rivers Okrika/Obigbo Rural 
Imo Umuahia Urban 
Bende Rural 
Niger Bida Urban 
Agaie Rural 
Sokoto Kaura Namoda Rural 
Gusau Semi-urban 
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, no.32, vol. 76, May 1989. 
'Essentially metropolitan. 
V. Fiscal operations at the local level 
The third tier of government in Nigeria receives certain transfers from the federal and 
state governments to enable local governments to meet part of their recurrent and capital 
expenditures. The transfers range from statutory allocations to primary education funds. 
From states, local governments also receive statutory allocations, grants, loans and funds 
for certain projects. Table 2 presents federal statutory allocations to local governments 
for the period 1976-1990. Federal allocations, which totaled N100 million in 1976, 
increased to N250 million in 1977 but then declined to N150 million in 1978. Between 
1976 and 1980, federal allocations to local governments grew by 28.7%. The observed 
increases between 1979 and 1982 were the result of the creation of more local governments 
by the civilian administration. 
It must be noted that states are mandated to allocate 10% of their internally generated 
revenue to local governments within their jurisdiction. In other words, of the allocation 
received from the federal government, the states must ensure that local governments 
receive their allocations on the basis of factors such as minimum responsibility of 
government (equality of local governments), population, social development factors as 
reflected by primary school enrolment, internal revenue efforts, etc. Table 3 as an example 
presents some evidence of Bendel State allocation to its local governments. 
During the period of structural adjustment, that is 1986-1990, allocations to local 
governments showed remarkable increases. The ratio of federal allocation to federal 
revenue, which was 1.5% in 1976, increased slightly until 1980. Between 1976 and 1980, 
the ratio averaged about 2.3%. From 1981, federal allocation as a proportion of federal 
revenue rose remarkably, averaging almost 9% during the period 1981 to 1990. 
The stabilization and structural adjustment packages of 1983-1986 insisted that local 
governments were to generate internal revenues in order to reduce fiscal dependence on 
the other arms of government. Statutory allocations by the federal government to local 
governments in selected states are highlighted in Table 4. From all the states, allocations 
increased from 1979 to 1990. The statutory allocation for Anambra, which was N14.0 
million in 1979 (N27.9 million in real terms), jumped to N331.8 million in 1990 (N187.9 
million in real terms), representing a compound growth rate of 30.2%. For the same 
period allocations to Bendel, Kaduna, Lagos and Ogun grew by 30.5%, 26.7%, 29.2% 
and 30.2%, respectively. We need to mention that the allocations are in nominal terms; 
because of the high inflation rates during 1980-1990, allocations in real terms are smaller. 
Local governments in Bendel State seemed to have improved their internally generated 
revenue. In 1976, internal revenue was N1.5 million; it increased throughout the period, 
registering the highest amount of N19 million in 1990. Notwithstanding, statutory 
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Table 2 : N iger ia : Federa l s ta tu tory a l loca t ions of r e v e n u e to local g o v e r n m e n t s , 1976-1992 
( N mil l ion) . 
Year FA1 % change FA FR 2 FA/FR % 
1976 100.0 _ 6765.9 1.5 
1977 250.0 150.0 8042.2 3.1 
1978 150.0 40.0 7469.3 2.0 
1979 261.4 74.3 10913.5 2.4 
1980 352.6 34.9 15234.0 2.3 
1981 1085.0 207.8 12190.2 8.9 
1982 1081.7 -0.3 11764.4 9.2 
1983 976.9 -9.7 10508.7 9.3 
1984 1061.5 8.7 11766.8 9.0 
1985 1327.5 25.1 14680.8 9.0 
1986 1166.9 -12.1 12837.6 9.1 
1987 2117.8 81.5 25099.8 8.4 
1988 2727.1 28.8 27310.8 10.0 
1989 3399.8 24.7 50272.1 6.8 
1990 7680.0 125.9 66895.4 11.5 
1991 10764.8 40.2 78640.7 13.7 
1992 16488.0 53.2 138617.0 11.9 
Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Lagos. 
1 Federal allocation. 
2 Federal revenue 
Table 3 : Externa l a n d in terna l s o u r c e s of r e v e n u e for B e n d e l State local g o v e r n m e n t , 1976-
8 6 ( N mi l l ion) 
Year FA' SA 2 IR3 TR 4 FA'+SAWR" 
1976 5.0 . 1.5 6.5 76.9 
1977 11.6 18.5 2.8 32.9 91.5 
1978 7.0 9.3 3.9 20.2 80.6 
1979 14.6 2.6 5.6 22.8 75.4 
1980 4.4 1.9 3.2 19.5 83.6 
1981 45.3 0.6 4.2 50.1 91.6 
1982 55.9 - 4.8 60.7 92.1 
1983 42.3 - 3.8 46.1 91.7 
1984 46.9 - 6.1 53.0 88.5 
1985 70.9 - 10.7 76.2 85.9 
1986 70.9 - 19.0 89.9 78.8 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Benin. 
1 Federal statutory allocation. 
2 State statutory allocation. 
3 Internal generated revenue. 
4 Total revenue. 
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Table 4: Nigeria: Statutory allocations to local governments In selected states, 1979-92 (N 
million) 
Year Anambra Bendel Kaduna Lagos Ogun 
1979 14.0 12.8 15.2 11.4 10.3 
1980 21.0 16.6 23.5 12.5 12.5 
1981 59.6 51.8 69.5 39.7 42.0 
1982 60.7 50.6 65.2 44.5 38.1 
1983 58.6 48.7 63.1 42.6 36.7 
1984 62.4 51.8 67.1 45.3 39.0 
1985 78.0 64.8 83.8 56.7 48.8 
1986 68.4 57.0 73.8 49.8 42.8 
1987 123.1 102.0 112.1 89.0 76.5 
1988 155.3 128.4 96.7 111.4 95.4 
1989 193.6 160.2 123.6 139.1 118.7 
1990 331.8 313.0 259.8 246.5 243.5 
1991 375.6 218.9 370.9 818.1 322.9 
1992 396.1 813.6 523.8 493.1 436.0 
Source: Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Lagos. 
*1992 figure for Bendel is for Edo and Delta states. 
allocations still constituted a substantial proportion of total revenue (see Table 3). It will 
be noticed that the federal allocations to Bendel State (Table 4) do not correspond to 
those listed in Table 3. The officials at the state level blamed federal officials for not 
keeping proper records. However, we were informed that at times allocations are adjusted 
after the formal revenue-sharing; these adjustments are never properly recorded and 
more often federal and state officials do not reconcile their records. This partly explains 
the discrepancy. 
VI. Fiscal operations of selected local 
governments 
The fiscal profiles of the 13 local governments are presented in tables A1 to A24 in the 
Appendix. All the local governments had episodes of both budget surpluses and deficits. 
In some of the local governments (LGs), the deficits were large, notably Ijebu-North, 
Bida and Bichi. When compared with our previous work (Ekpo and Ndebbio, 1991), the 
LGs appeared to have performed better than either federal or state governments during 
the same period. On the average, both revenue and expenditure grew positively during 
the period under study. For Ijebu-North, revenue was at its peak between 1988 and 
1989, when it grew by 82%; between 1990 and 1991, expenditure registered a growth 
rate of -20.7%. The growth of expenditure in 1988 was 212.4% and that year had the 
largest deficit. 
It is interesting to note that for all the LGs, except Bichi and Bida, some fiscal balance 
occurred during the adjustment period (1986-1991). During this period, there were strict 
policy guidelines for maintaining a balanced budget at all levels of government. It should 
be noted that the Calabar municipal government maintained deficits consistently from 
1983 to 1989. Before analysing the composition of revenue and expenditure patterns, let 
us look at the nature of financial transfers between levels of government. 
Local governments depend heavily on statutory allocations from the federal 
government. The country's constitution mandates that local governments receive 25% 
of the federation account. The ratio has varied between 10% and 15% but the new revenue 
allocation formula puts the ratio at 20% (less than what the constitution allows). Also, 
state governments are expected to pay 10% of their internally generated revenue to their 
local governments. 
The evidence available suggests that local government revenue emanates mainly from 
transfers from the central government. On the average, federal statutory allocations 
constitute more than 70% of the LGs revenues. In the Ijebu-North LG, federal allocation 
represented 94% of revenue in 1980; it declined, thereafter, and by 1991, it stood at 83%. 
In the 13 LGs, only Calabar and Ikeja derived less than 60% of revenue from federal 
allocations. In fact, in 1986, federal allocation to the Calabar municipal government was 
35.4%. 
State governments have persistently not made allocations to LGs. During our field 
work, there were a lot of complaints by LG officials about the refusal of state governments 
to allocate funds due to them. Of the 13 local governments, only Bichi and Gusau seemed 
to have received their statutory allocations from their respective states (Kano and Sokoto). 
As shown in Table A10, state allocation which represented 24% of revenue in 1980 
dropped to 1.5% in 1991. Bichi LG, like others, depends on the centre for funds. For the 
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period under study, Agaie LG in Niger received no state allocation, while Bida LG in the 
same state received state funds for only 1980 and 1981. However, Agaie LG received 
substantial grants form the state government. 
It is important to note that state grants are not substitutes for state statutory allocations. 
The grants are made for specific projects such as the building of schools, health centres 
etc, by local governments. In some cases, grants are given to LGs to enable them to 
execute projects and programmes initiated by the state governments, for example, the 
transition to civil rule programme and the better life programme, among others for which 
LGS have no funds. 
Local governments have attempted to generate their own revenue to finance their 
commitments. LGs like Bida, Calabar and Bichi made substantial progress in internal 
revenue generation during this period. If local autonomy is to make any sense, then 
financial independence ought to be sought by LGs. Financial independence at the local 
level calls for fiscal decentralization.The efforts of some LGs are being thwarted by the 
intervention of state governments in the functions of local governments. As a result, 
revenue sources meant for LGs become the purview of state governments. 
It could be observed that there exist variations in the pattern of state allocations to 
LGs. The reasons for the variation are mixed. Our field study revealed that: (1) some 
states refused to fulfill their mandate, claiming that they implemented various projects in 
the LGs (a type of statutory allocation in kind); (2) states maintained that the decline in 
revenue received from the federation account resulted in their inability to honour their 
statutory obligations; and (3) others claimed to be penalizing LGs that have not performed 
satisfactorily based on previous state allocation. In most cases, state government officials 
insisted that they were only owing or delaying and that payments will be effected to LGs 
when funds are available. The evidence (see tables in the appendix) showed that some 
state governments owed statutory allocations for more than five years. This partly explains 
why some LGs had to resort to commercial banks for loans. 
Table 5 summarizes the growth of internally generated revenue by LGs. In the pre-
adjustment period (1980-1985), internal revenue showed a remarkable growth in all the 
LGs studied when compared with the adjustment era. On the other hand, federal allocations 
grew faster than internally generated revenues in the adjustment period. The lowest rate 
was in K/Namoda where between 1980 and 1985, internally generated revenue declined 
by 13.4 percent. 
For the period 1980-1985, Odeda local government recorded the highest growth (69.6 
%) of internally generated revenue. This was followed by Bida and Agaie with growth 
rates of 59.8% and 50.9%, respectively. It is interesting that during this period, rural 
based local governments were more aggressive in increasing internal revenue than urban 
based ones. 
As indicated in the fiscal profiles of selected local governments, deficits and surpluses 
do exist. Our field work revealed that in the case of surpluses, local governments do not 
lose them to either federal or state governments. The surpluses are often used to meet 
development objectives and other social needs. Some of the surpluses have occurred due 
to arrears owed to local governments from either federal or state governments; others are 
due to unexpected grants from the other arms of government. Furthermore, allocation 
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Table 5: Compound growth rate of fiscal variables in selected local governments in Nigeria, 
1980-1991 (%) 
Local govts. Inter, generated rev. Federal alloc 
1980-85 1986-1991 1980-85 1986-91 
Ijebu-North 44.6 10.3 11.4 35.2 
Odeda 69.6 9.9 -0.4 42.4 
Calabar 16.6 10.3 11.8 72.2 
Agaie 50.9 12.3 -3.9 55.8 
Bida 59.8 6.7 8.4 48.4 
Bichi 17.8 7.0 13.9 21.3 
Bassa 22.7 10.4 24.3 35.3 
Umuahia 2.2* 7.3 35.5* 15.0 
Gusau 13.0 -17.7 20.5 22.3 
K/Namoda -13.4 23.8** -24.4 71.9 
Ikeja 18.5 - -1.4 -
Ejigbo 8.7 - 16.0 -
Okpebho 17.2 - 22.7 -
Source: Computed from data derived from questionnaires 
* for 1981-85; " f o r 1986-90. 
formulas have changed considerably over time. New allocation formulas are often back-
dated hence arrears are paid to respective local government areas. Deficits, where they 
exist, are the obligations of the local governments. 
Deficits, where they exist, are the obligations of the local governments, and are financed 
through loans from either state governments or commercial banks as well as grants from 
state governments. Most of the deficits occur from the recurrent expenditures especially 
in meeting personnel costs, etc. In the early 1980s, at the start of the depression, most 
local governments were unable to meet their financial obligations to workers. The state 
loans are those guaranteed by the state governments. They have been designated " state 
loans" because in case of default, state governments have to pay. Most commercial bank 
loans obtained by local governments were short term in nature. A few were overdrafts 
while LGs awaited either federal or state allocations. In some local governments, we 
were informed that payments for the loans are deducted at source. That is, banks deducted 
payments with interest before crediting the account of the respective local governments. 
Ekpo and Ndebbio (1991) showed that both federal and state governments had fiscal 
imbalances for a considerable length of time even during the period of structural 
adjustment. Federal government violated its own guidelines, as fiscal imbalances 
characterized its fiscal operations. The situation appeared different for Local governments, 
however, in the early 1980s, local governments did not have many responsibilities and 
depended on both the state and the centre for revenues. Their internally generated revenues 
were quite insignificant, and they were not allowed to borrow. During the adjustment 
era, virtually all local governments intensified their revenue generating efforts. Moreover, 
their allocations from the federation Account increased from 15% to 20% and state 
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governments were mandated to meet their statutory obligations (10% of states' internally 
generated revenues) to local governments. Another important factor is that beginning in 
1987, local governments were democratized, hence elected officials had to demonstrate 
some sense of financial discipline and accountability under the watchful eyes of the 
military regime. 
Now that local governments are allowed to borrow and even float bonds, the situation 
could be different in the future. Whatever happens will be influenced by the investment 
companies recently set up by most local governments in the country. These new investment 
companies are supposed to seek funds to finance projects and issue commercial papers 
in the interest of local governments. Another development that could affect the fiscal 
profile of local governments is their effort to establish or own controlling shares in 
community banks - a recent occurrence in Nigeria's financial market. Local government 
officials also informed us that they own shares in other financial institutions in the country. 
Given the experiences of other levels of government, the new borrowing right of local 
governments may lead to deficits in the near future. Therefore, there is need for constant 
monitoring. 
It must be noted that as part of controlling or instilling financial discipline there are 
prescribed spending limits for local governments. For any yearly internally generated 
revenue above N2 million, only N250,000 can be spent by councils and N100,000 by the 
finance and general purpose committee subject to local government (in council) approval. 
Between Nlmillion and N2 million, local councils can spend N100,000, while N50,000 
is the limit for the finance and general purpose committee. For revenue below N1 million, 
N50,000 can be dispensed by councils while N25,000 is the limit for the finance and 
general purpose committee subject to council's approval. State commissioners have to 
approve contract awards below N1 million or the level for the particular local government 
while the approval of the state executive council is needed for contracts above N1 million. 
In our analysis, we relied mostly on data derived from questionnaires. The figures we 
have used are actual. In Table A33, we tried to compare actual and budget estimates for 
two local governments - Calabar and Ijebu- North. The performance of the two local 
governments in terms of internally generated revenues and expenditures are mixed. 
Comparing actual and estimates for Calabar municipal government, performance ranged 
from 52% in 1980 to 171% in 1981. Actual revenues exceeded estimated internal revenue 
for 5 out of 12 years. This trend cannot be generalized. Though evidence for other LGs is 
not presented because of paucity of data, the few we examined showed mixed 
performance. 
VII. Sources and composition of local 
government revenue 
The sources and composition of internally generated revenue are presented in tables A25 
to A32 in the Appendix. It is quite apparent that taxes continue to form the bulk of 
internal revenue. There is also a list of user charges, royalties and proceeds from stocks 
and shares that are lumped in the category of "others." Most officials at the local level 
explained that revenues that cannot be categorized under the normal codes were designated 
as "other charges". The rural local governments seem to show a near absence of fines as 
a source of revenue. This is not unexpected in a rural setting where problems of 
urbanization are yet to manifest themselves. 
For all the local governments, taxes, rates, fines, fees and licenses increased during 
the period under review. In Ijebu-North local government, taxes jumped from N31,000 
(N55, 258.19 in real terms) in 1980 to N121.000 (N67.760.0 in real terms) in 1984 and 
by 1991 taxes stood at N132,000 (N74,745.19 in real terms). Between 1980 and 1991 
taxes grew by 12.8%. During the same period, rates and fees grew by 31.2% and 18.9%, 
respectively. However, in metropolitan Calabar, taxes and rates grew by 5.1% and 9.8% 
respectively, during the same period . On the other hand, licenses declined by 4.4%. For 
all the local governments, it appears that all sources of revenue increased during the 
period of structural adjustment (See also Table A33 in the Appendix). 
Because of new development responsibilities placed on local governments, additional 
sources of revenue must be identified. It is necessary to state that while increasing internal 
revenues to balance the budget may be desirable, it may lead to governance problems. 
For example, local fees may be regressive and there may be efficiency grounds for 
subsidizing the activities for which LGs have started charging fees. 
VIII. Pattern and expenditures 
Both current and capital expenditures for the 13 LGs are shown in Table A34 in the 
Appendix. Most of the recurrent expenditure is for personnel cost. For the rural based 
LGS, the bulk of capital expenditures is on agriculture, rural development and health 
services. LGs like Odeda, Bassa and Agaie expend most of their capital budget on rural 
infrastructure, education and health. The urban LGs also spend a lot on education and 
general administration. The growth of expenditures is indicated in Table 6. Nothing 
significant can be discerned except to note that for 1980-1985 capital expenditures for 
Bida, Agaie and Bichi grew negatively, by -28.2%, -14.8% and -0.9%, respectively. 
Furthermore, Agaie had a negative growth in current expenditures for the period 1980-
1985. 
It is interesting to note that during the period of depression, 1980-1985, six out of ten 
local governments registered negative growth rates in capital expenditures. Gusau h a d -
43.6%, while Bida had -2.82% growth in capital expenditures. On the other hand, Calabar, 
a municipal council showed a 94.4% growth in capital projects. According to the officials, 
most of the expenditures were on roads and drainage, health and education. However, 
the adjustment era witnessed remarkable increases in capital expenditures. All local 
governments indicated positive growth in capital expenditures. It must be noted that the 
situation may not be due to the positive impact of adjustment but rather to the mandate 
given to state governments to pay their statutory obligations to local governments, as 
well as to the increase of local governments' share of the federation account by the 
central government. 
Specifically, current expenditure, which was Nl,878,000 (N2,694,000 in real terms) 
in 1981 for Umuahia local government, increased to N4,324,000 (N5,344,000 in real 
terms) in 1983 and by 1991 it was N6,221,000 (N3,534,000 in real terms). In the Ikeja 
local government, which could be described as a metropolitan area due to the size of its 
population, expenditures grew negatively in 1981, 1984 and 1986. The revenue base of 
Ikeja is relatively strong when compared with others. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
revenue increased consistently from 1980 to 1986. 
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Table 6: Compound growth of expenditure pattern in selected local governments 1980-1991 (%) 
Local govts Current Capital 
1980-85 1986-91 1980-85 1986-91 
Ijebu-North 7.7 34.0 9.8 27.0 Odeda 7.2 39.1 27.7 32.1 Bida 3.4 40.4 -28.2 73.8 Agaie -3.9 39.8 -14.8 173.3 Bassa 23.3 33.0 24.9 38.2 Bichi 30.8 16.7 -.09 34.1 Calabar 11.8 30.6 94.4 68.6 Umuahia 19.6 16.2 -23.2 125.6 Gusau -2.8 25.2 -43.6 17.9 K/Namoda 5.6 -2.3 -30.2 57.1 
Source: Computed from data derived from questionnaires. 
IX. Local governments and other levels of 
government 
Apart from the financial relationship between local governments and the other levels of 
government, there exist specific duties and responsibilities solely meant for local 
governments. Conflicts do occur among the tiers of government especially between the 
local and state governments. The financial responsibilities are straightforward, for they 
involve financial transfers—grants or statutory allocations from federal and state to local 
governments. Sometimes there are specific grants designed to solve specific problems 
like flood, erosion, etc. At times there are conflicts when the federal government allocates 
a grant to a local government through the state government because the local government 
may not receive the appropriate amount. 
There are also instances when it is not clear which level of government is responsible 
for providing certain services. For example, in 1988/89 the Calabar municipal government 
had to "battle" with the state government over control of primary education within the 
municipality. These conflicts arise because of the nature of spelling out or identifying 
which tier of government ought to perform certain function(s). Any level of government 
can go to the court to contest any encroachment on its functions. 
The 1989 constitution (Fourth Schedule) indicated the main functions of local 
governments as: 
• Formulation of economic planning and development schemes for the local government 
area 
• Collection of rates and radio and television licenses 
• Establishment and maintenance of cemeteries and burial grounds and homes for the 
destitute or infirm 
• Licensing of bicycles, trucks (other than mechanically propelled trucks), canoes, 
wheelbarrows and carts 
• Establishment, maintenance and regulation of slaughter houses, slaughter slabs, 
markets, motor parks and public conveniences 
• Construction and maintenance of roads, streets, street lighting, drains, parks, gardens, 
open spaces, or such public facilities as may be prescribed from time to time by the 
House of Assembly of the state 
8 Naming of roads and streets and numbering of houses 
• Provision and maintenance of public conveniences, sewage and refuse disposal 
• Registration of all births, deaths and marriages 
8 Assessment of privately owned houses or tenements for the purpose of levying such 
rates as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly of a state 
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• Control and regulation of: 
- outdoor advertising and hoarding 
- movement and keeping of pets of all descriptions 
- shops and kiosks 
- cooked food sold to the public 
- laundries 
8 Licensing, regulation and control of the sale of liquor 
a Participation in: 
- provision and maintenance of primary, adult and vocational education 
- development of agriculture and natural resources (other than the exploitation of 
minerals) 
- provision and maintenance of health services 
8 Any other functions that may be conferred by the state assembly 
A close look at these duties will reveal areas of conflict since states have very similar 
functions according to the 1989 constitution. It is clear that local governments are 
supposed to enhance growth and development within their areas of jurisdiction. In virtually 
all local governments, growth efforts are noticeable. Most of the local governments have 
floated investment companies to source for funds in both capital and money markets. 
Funds raised are to be used to finance projects jointly or solely with individuals or 
institutions. 
Local governments are involved in rural development, road construction and rural 
electrification. These efforts are more noticeable in rural-based local governments; some 
of these activities are cosponsored by DFRRI (Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural 
Infrastructures), the Better Life Programme and NGOs. The local governments we have 
examined are investing in health, education, provision of pure water, etc., in order to 
improve the life of the people. More importantly, some own sizeable shares in the newly 
established community banks. This way local governments are contributing to the growth 
process. How effective these efforts are is beyond the scope of this study. 
X. Conclusion 
We analysed fiscal operations in 13 local governments concentrating on the period 1980-
1991. The 1976 reforms resulted in a fundamental change in the development of LGs in 
Nigeria. More importantly, the reforms initiated statutory allocations of revenues from 
the federation account and from state government revenues to local governments. Local 
governments began to receive direct allocations from both the federal and state 
governments in 1977. For most of the period of study, however, state governments did 
not fulfill their mandate regarding statutory allocations to LGs, 
Allocations from the federation account to local governments increased over time 
from 1979 to 1990. For example, allocations to Bendel, Kaduna, Lagos and Ogun grew 
by 30.5%, 26.7%, 29.2% and 30.2%, respectively. Local governments, like their state 
counterparts, were heavily dependent on federal allocations in order to meet both recurrent 
and capital expenditures. Most of the recurrent expenditures were for personnel costs 
(Ekpo and Ndebbio, 1991). 
It is interesting that almost all local governments except Bichi and Bida experienced 
fiscal balance during the adjustment period (1989-1991). This was not only because 
there were strict guidelines on the need to maintain a balanced budget but also because 
internally generated revenues increased during the period. That is, efforts by local 
governments to generate revenues showed remarkable improvement. Some state 
governments have persistently defaulted in paying their statutory allocations to local 
governments within their jurisdiction. Nonetheless, local governments do not seem to 
be the cause of macro imbalances— unlike the case with federal and state governments 
as confirmed by Ekpo and Ndebbio (1991). Before the SAP, local governments registered 
high deficits partly due to high recurrent and capital expenditures. Moreover, the 
politicization of local governments, that is the implementation of electoral politics, resulted 
in promised development projects not matched by available resources. The deficits of 
local governments have been financed through state guaranteed loans, loans from 
commercial banks and state grants. Surpluses that occurred in some of the local 
governments for certain years were not returned to the states or the centre, but were used 
to fund local projects. 
The 1976 reforms also stated the internal revenue sources of local governments so as 
to reduce areas of conflict with state governments. Taxes continue to form the largest 
share of internally generated revenue. The rural local governments appear to show a 
near absence of fines as a source of revenue. For all the local governments, taxes, rates, 
fines, fees and licenses increased during the period under review. 
With the enormous tasks of developing their jurisdictions, local governments ought 
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to be encouraged to continue to increase their internally generated revenue sources and 
find new ways of enhancing revenues. Local governments could embark on joint ventures 
with individuals and state governments and participate in the establishment and ownership 
of small-scale industries. This is not in conflict with the ongoing privatization programme; 
rather, it is part of showing the lead in rural industrialization. When the industries are 
running efficiently, they can then be commercialized. A lot of opportunities present 
themselves in the agricultural sector, for example, food processing industries, and sourcing 
for raw materials. These efforts could increase LGs' internal revenue through the PAYE 
tax and profits realized from such projects. 
It is also important that local governments be made accountable to the electorate 
through monitoring, given the present new right to borrow. Local governments started 
to float bonds in 1984. This avenue of finance, if properly managed, will enhance the 
development role of LGs as well as provide a mechanism for realistic fiscal projections. 
This will minimize the dependence on federal sources of revenue, which often fluctuates. 
In addition, this will imply some financial independence to LGs thereby suggesting a 
degree of fiscal decentralization. 
However, the efforts of LGs to attain some financial autonomy is being disturbed by 
the intervention of state governments in local functions. In some areas, revenues meant 
for LGs have even been taken over by state governments. It follows that as much as 
possible, the federal government should reduce or eliminate areas of conflict between 
local and state governments. 
This study has shown that in a federal structure like Nigeria, fiscal operations at the 
local level remain an important area of investigation. Furthermore, in order to ascertain 
the nature and character of fiscal imbalances in an economy, the inter-fiscal relations 
between the existing tiers of government must be examined. 
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Appendix 
Table A 1 : I j e b u - N o r t h local g o v e r n m e n t : R e v e n u e a n d e x p e n d i t u r e a n d their g r o w t h 1 9 8 0 -
1991 ( ' 000 naira) 
Year Rev (%) Expend (%) Surp/Def Fin. 
1980 1091 1314 -223 SL 
1981 1106 1.4 1203 8.4 -97 SG 
1982 1248 12.8 1416 17.7 -168 SG 
1983 1396 11.9 1587 12.1 -191 CBL 
1984 1979 41.8 1318 -17.0 +661 
1985 2557 29.2 2204 67.2 +353 
1986 2937 14.9 3155 43.1 -218 C B L 
1987 4992 70.0 3683 16.7 +1309 -
1988 6310 26.4 11054 212.4 -5194 NA 
1989 11509 82.4 8727 -26.7 +3082 — 
1990 19098 66.0 14827 76.0 +4271 _ 
1991 15145 -20.7 15072 17.0 +73 -
Source: Derived from administered questionnaires. 
Notes: - deficit; + surplus; growth in brackets; SL= state loan; SG= state grant; CBL commercial bank loan. 
Table A 2 : I j e b u - N o r t h local g o v e r n m e n t : Internal ly g e n e r a t e d revenue, s ta tutory a l locat ions 
( ' 000 nai ra) a n d s h a r e s (%) 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 9 1 
Year IR IR/R FA FA/R SA SA/R 
1980 66 6.0 1025 94.0 
1981 111 10.0 995 90.0 - — 
1982 125 10.0 1123 90.0 — _ 
1983 279 20.0 1117 80.0 _ — 
1984 396 20.0 1583 80.0 — — 
1985 603 24.0 1954 76.0 — — 
1986 886 30.0 2051 70.0 — _ 
1987 644 13.0 4348 87.0 — _ 
1988 959 15.0 5351 85.0 - _ 
1989 1250 11.0 7268 63.0 2991 26.0 
1990 2729 14 15834 83.0 535 3.0 
1991 1596 10 12536 83.0 1013 7.0 
Source: Same as in Table 1. 
Notes: iR = internally generated revenue; R = overall revenue; FA = federal allocation; SA = state allocation; 
- = none available. 
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Table A3: Odeda local government: Revenue and expenditure and their annual growth, 
1980-1991 ('000 naira) 
Year Revenue (%) Expenditure (%) Surplus/deficit 
1980 42 _ 915 -873 NA 
1981 2994 4885 1635 78.7 +459 -
1982 2149 2.6 2231 36.4 -82 CBL 
1983 2166 0.8 2225 -0.31 -59 CBL 
1984 2290 5.7 2372 6.6 -82 CBL 
1985 3003 31.1 2198 -7.3 +805 -
1996 3369 12.2 3751 70.6 -382 NA 
1987 3814 13.2 3898 3.9 -84 CBL 
1988 6810 78.5 6805 74.6 +5 -
1989 8741 28.4 7302 7.3 +1439 -
1990 16537 53.4 21895 54.6 +3473 -
Source: See Table A1. 
Table A4: Odeda local government: Internally generated revenue,statutory allocations ('000 
naira) and shares (%) 1980-1991 
Year IR IR/R FA FA/R SA/R SA/R 
1980 42 100 — _ 
1981 90 4.3 2004 95.7 - -
1982 110 5.1 2039 94.9 -
1983 127 5.9 2039 94.1 - -
1984 286 12.5 2004 66.7 - -
1985 999 33.3 2004 82.8 - -
1986 581 17.2 2788 82.6 - -
1987 434 11.4 3380 88.6 - -
1988 589 8.6 6221 91.4 234 2.7 
1989 692 7.9 7815 89.4 234 2.7 
1990 716 4.3 15445 93.4 376 2.3 
1991 1025 4.0 23258 91.7 1085 4.3 
Source: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2. 
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Table A5: Calabar municipal government: Revenue, expenditure and their growth 1980-
1991 ('000 naira) 
Year Revenue % Expenditure % Surp.def. Fin. 
1980 1045 _ 1182 -137 SG 1981 1366 30,7 1477 25.0 -111 SG 1982 2022 48.0 1996 35.1 +26 1983 1706 -15.6 1874 -6.1 -168 CBL 1984 2416 41.6 2429 29.6 -13 SL 1985 2276 -5.8 3715 52.9 -1439 SL 1986 2939 29.1 3567 -4.0 -628 CBL 1987 4655 58.4 4749 33.1 -94 CBL 1988 7839 68.4 8586 80.8 -974 CBL 1989 9749 24.4 8057 -6.2 +1692 _ 1990 28621 193.6 23384 190.2 +5237 1991 30926 8.1 31201 33.4 -275 CBL 
Source: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2. 
Table A6: Calabar municipal government: Internally generated revenue, statutory allocations 
('000 naira) and shares(%), 1980-1991 
Year IR IR/R FA FA/R SA SA/R 
1980 452 43.2 593 56.8 1981 610 44.7 737 54.4 19 1.3 1982 892 44.1 1100 54.4 _ _ 1983 699 41.0 1007 59.0 _ 1984 1386 57.4 1030 42.6 _ — 1985 1116 49.0 1160 51.0 _ 1986 1900 64.6 1039 35.4 1987 2494 53.6 2161 46.4 — 1988 2797 35.7 5042 64.3 1989 1225 12.6 8524 87.4 1990 1284 4.5 26746 93.4 591 2.1 1991 3422 11.1 27131 87.7 373 1.2 
Source: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2. 
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Table A7: Agaie local government: Revenue, expenditure and their growth, 1980-1991 ('000 
naira) 
Year Revenue % Expend. % Surp.def. Fin. 
1980 1999 2246 _ -247 SG 
1981 2880 44.1 3093 37.7 -213 SG 
1982 2164 -24.9 2129 -31.2 +35 -
1983 1943 -10.2 1872 -12.1 +71 -
1984 1703 -12.4 1403 -25.1 +300 -
1985 1795 5.4 1667 18.8 +128 -
1986 964 -46.3 1743 4.6 -779 SG 
1987 1179 22.3 1146 -34.3 + 33 -
1988 1176 -0.3 2251 96.4 -1075 SG 
1989 5031 237.8 3160 40.4 +1871 -
1990 10557 109.8 9722 538.9 +835 -
1991 12285 16.4 14228 46.3 -1943 SG 
Sources: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2, 
Table A8: Agaie local government: Internally generated revenue, statutory allocations ('000 
naira) and shares (%), 1980-1991 
Year IR IR/R FA FA/R SA SA/R 
1980 20 1.0 1979 99.0 _ 
1981 26 0.9 2854 99.1 - -
1982 60 2.8 2104 97.2 - -
1983 .30 1.5 1913 98.5 - -
1984 115 6.8 1588 93.2 - -
1985 236 13.1 1559 86.9 - -
1986 122 12.7 842 87.3 - -
1987 142 12.0 1037 88.0 - -
1988 88 7.5 1088 82.5 — -
1989 456 9.1 4575 80.9 - -
1990 92 0.9 10465 99.1 - -
1991 245 2.0 12040 98.0 - -
Source: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2. 
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Table A9: Bichi local government: Revenue, expenditure and their growth, 1980-1991 ( ' 0 0 0 
naira) 
Year Revenue % Expenditure % Surp/def. Fin. 
1980 1071 . 895 +176 
1981 1287 20.2 1096 22.5 +191 -
1982 1526 18.6 1033 21.6 +193 — 
1983 1287 -15.7 1020 -23.5 +267 -
1984 1385 7.6 1433 40.5 - 4 8 SG 
1985 1833 32.3 1648 15.0 +185 -
1986 5853 219.3 6485 293.5 -632 SG 
1987 6356 8.6 6966 7.5 -610 CBL 
1988 6979 9.8 6708 -3.7 +271 — 
1989 7203 3.2 7850 17.0 -647 CBL 
1990 7942 10.3 9898 26.1 -1956 SG 
1991 17027 114.4 19774 99.8 -2747 SL 
Notes: See Table A2. 
Source: See Table A1. 
Table A10: Bichi local government: Internally generated revenue, statutory allocations 
('000 naira) and shares (%) 1980-1991 
Year IR IR/R FA FA/R SA SA/R 
1980 112 10.5 702 65.5 257 24.0 
1981 136 10.6 901 70.0 250 19.4 
1982 201 13.6 1024 67.1 301 19.7 
1983 200 15.5 807 62.7 280 21.7 
1984 230 16.6 902 65.1 253 18.3 
1985 300 16.4 1533 83.6 — — 
1986 685 11.7 4937 84.3 231 4.0 
1987 906 14.3 5300 83.4 150 2.3 
1988 1010 14.5 5300 76.0 669 9.5 
1989 600 8.3 6000 83.3 603 8.4 
1990 642 8.1 7000 88.1 300 3.8 
1991 1027 6.0 15750 92.5 250 1.5 
Source: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2. 
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Table A11: Bida local government: Revenue, expenditure and their growth, 1980-1991 
('000 naira) 
Year Revenue % Expenditure % Surp./def. Fin. 
1980 4112 _ 4403 -282 SG 
1981 5830 41.5 6173 40.2 -343 SG 
1982 2943 -49.5 2980 -51.7 - 3 7 SG 
1983 2371 -19.4 2404 -19.3 - 3 3 SL 
1984 5797 144.5 5695 136.9 +102 -
1985 4977 -14.1 4784 -16.0 +193 -
1986 2626 -47.2 2863 -40.2 -237 CBL 
1987 2549 -2 .9 2614 -8 .7 - 6 5 CBL 
1988 3624 42.2 4173 59.6 -549 NA 
1989 9752 169.1 12218 192.8 -2466 NA 
1990 25117 157.6 21183 73.4 +3934 -
1991 22523 -10.3 26434 24.8 -3911 CBLVSG 
Source: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2. 
Table A12: Bida local government: Internally generated revenue, statutory allocations 
('000 naira) and shares (%) 1980-1991 
Year IR IR/R FA FA/R SA SA/R 
1980 38 0.9 2671 64.8 1412 34.3 
1981 154 2.6 2717 46.6 2959 50.8 
1982 517 17.6 2426 82.4 - -
1983 199 8.4 2172 91.6 - -
1984 468 8.1 5329 91.9 - -
1985 632 12.7 4345 87.3 - -
1986 603 23.0 2023 73.0 - -
1987 376 14.8 2173 85.2 - -
1988 651 18.0 2973 82.0 - -
1989 657 6.7 9095 93.3 - -
1990 809 3.2 24308 96.8 - -
1991 892 4.0 21631 96.0 - -
Source: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2. 
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Table A13: Bassa local government: Revenue, expenditure and their Growth, 1980-1991 ('000 
naira) 
Year Revenue % Expenditure % Surp/def. Fin. 
1980 992 _ 975 _ +17 
1981 2456 147.6 3673 276.7 -1217 SG 
1982 2727 11.0 2757 -25.0 -30 SG 
1983 2305 -15.5 2358 -14.5 -53 SG 
1984 2946 27.9 3133 32.9 -187 CBL 
1985 3617 22.8 3463 10.5 +154 -
1986 3135 -13.3 3226 -6.8 -91 CBL 
1987 5097 62.6 5267 63.3 -170 NA 
1988 7663 50.3 7565 43.6 +98 -
1989 7745 1.1 7610 0.6 +135 -
1990 16758 116.4 15280 100.8 +1478 -
1991 17373 3.7 18173 19.0 -800 CBL 
Source: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2. 
Table A14: Bassa local government: Internally generated revenue, statutory allocations 
('000 naira) and shares (%) 1980-1991 
Year IR IR/R FA FA/R SA SA/R 
1980 171 17.2 821 82.8 _ 
1981 120 4.9 2336 95.1 - -
1982 103 3.8 2624 96.2 - -
1983 92 4.0 2213 96.0 - -
1984 393 13.3 2553 86.7 - -
1985 584 16.1 3033 83.9 - -
1986 422 13.5 2713 86.5 - -
1987 881 17.3 4216 82.7 - -
1988 1501 19.6 6162 80.4 - -
1989 674 8.7 7071 81.3 - -
1990 699 4.2 16059 95.8 - -
1991 763 4.4 16610 95.6 - -
Source: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA 31 
Table A15: Umuahia local government: Revenue, expenditure and their growth, 1981-1991 
('000 naira) 
Year Revenue % Expenditure % Surp/def. Fin. 
1981 1959 _ 3799 -1840 SL 
1982 4952 152.8 6724 76.9 -1772 SL 
1983 4081 -17.6 4326 -35.7 -245 SG 
1984 2646 -35.2 6671 54.2 -4025 SL 
1985 4986 88.4 5103 -23.5 -117 SG 
1986 2409 -51.7 2590 -49.6 -161 SG 
1987 3989 65.6 3644 41.8 +345 
1988 8417 111.0 8785 141.1 -368 CBL 
1989 204 -2.5 8317 -5.3 -113 CBL 
1990 9811 19.6 9650 16.0 +161 
1991 6734 -31.3 11362 17.7 -4628 CBL 
Source: Derived from administered questionnaires. 
Notes: See Table A1. 
Table A16: Umuahia local government: Internally generated revenue, statutory allocations 
('000 naira) and shares (%) 1980-1991 
Year IR IR/R FA FA/R SA SA/R 
1981 1147 58.5 812 41.4 
1982 1322 26.7 3364 68.0 266 5.4 
1983 1001 24.5 1450 35.5 1630 39.9 
1984 1361 51.4 1285 48.6 - — 
1985 1281 25.7 3705 74.3 
1986 1277 53.0 1132 47.0 
1987 1268 31.8 2572 64.5 143 3.7 
1988 1306 15.5 6962 82.7 149 1.8 
1989 245 15.2 6959 84.8 250 3.0 
1990 1328 13.5 8284 84.4 199 2.0 
1991 1950 29.0 2617 38.9 2167 32.2 
Source: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2. 
3 2 RESEARCH PAPER 73 
Table A17: Gusau local government: Revenue, expenditure and their growth, 1980-1991 
('000 naira) 
Year Revenue % Expenditure % Surp/def. Fin. 
1980 2276 6965 -4689 SL 
1981 2853 25.4 6780 -2.7 -3927 SL 
1982 4659 63.3 6862 1.2 -2203 SG 
1983 4019 -13.7 8374 22.0 -4355 SG 
1984 4860 21.0 4506 -46.2 +354 — 
1985 5391 11.0 3990 -11.5 +1401 — 
1986 6731 24.9 3463 -13.2 +3268 — 
1987 7652 13.7 4777 37.9 +2875 — 
1988 10700 39.8 10470 119.2 +230 — 
1989 7472 -30.2 5570 -46.8 +1902 — 
1990 7843 5.0 5519 -0.9 +2324 — 
1991 14520 85.1 12688 129.9 +1832 -
Source: Derived from administered questionnaires. 
Notes: See Table A1. 
Table A18: Gusau local government: Internally generated revenue, statutory allocations 
('000 naira) and shares (%), 1980-1991 
Year IR IR/R% FA FA/R% SA SA/R% 
1980 952 41.8 1114 48.9 210 9.2 
1981 1095 38.4 1258 44.1 500 17.5 
1982 867 18.6 3792 81.4 - -
1983 705 17.5 3114 77.5 200 5.0 
1984 946 19.5 3914 80.5 — _ 
1985 1987 36.9 3404 63.1 — _ 
1986 2530 37.6 4097 60.9 104 1.5 
1987 2544 33.2 5108 66.7 - — 
1988 1961 18.3 6727 59.1 2412 22.5 
1989 1056 14.1 6141 82.2 275 3.7 
1990 1096 13.9 6742 86.0 5 0.1 
1991 787 5.4 13722 94.5 11 0.1 
Source: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2. 
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Table A19: Kaura Namoda local government: Revenue and expenditure and their growth, 
1980-1991 ('000 naira) 
Year Revenue % Expenditure % Surp/def. Fin. 
1980 2276 _ 5725 -3449 NA 
1981 2404 5.6 6320 10.4 -3916 CBL 
1982 4380 82.2 3390 -46.4 +990 -
1983 3922 -10.5 2777 -18.1 +1145 -
1984 1037 -73.6 5911 112.9 -4874 SL 
1985 533 -48.6 4686 -20.7 -4153 SL 
1986 815 52.9 6628 41.4 -5813 CBL 
1987 7372 804.5 5864 -11.5 +1508 -
1988 7530 2.1 8460 44.3 -930 CBL 
1989 8295 10.2 7802 -7.8 +493 -
1990 8219 -0.9 9158 17.4 -939 -
1991 - - - - -
Source: Derived from administered questionnaires. 
Notes: See Table A1. 
Table A20: Kaura Namoda local government: Internally generated revenue, statutory 
allocations ('000 naira) and shares (%), 1980-1991 
Year IR IR/R FA FA/R SA SA/R 
1 980 456 20.0 1820 80.0 - -
1981 580 24.1 1824 75.9 - -
1982 614 14.0 3766 86.0 - -
1983 834 21.3 3088 78.7 - -
1984 867 83.6 170 16.4 - -
1985 193 36.2 340 63.8 -
1986 351 43.1 464 56.9 -
1987 958 13.0 6121 83.0 293 4.0 
1988 377 5.0 6832 90.7 321 4.3 
1989 609 7.3 7327 88.3 359 4.3 
1990 1021 12.4 6972 84.8 226 2.7 
1991 — - _ — — — 
Source: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2. 
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Table A21: Ikeja local government; Revenue, expenditure and their growth, ('000 naira) 
1980-1986 
Year Revenue % Expenditure % Surp/def. Fin. 
1980 11830 12152 -322 CBL 
1981 5963 -49.6 4861 -60.0 +1102 -
1982 8538 43.2 7539 55.1 +999 — 
1983 10018 17.3 9174 21.7 +844 — 
1984 10344 3.3 7476 -18.5 +2868 — 
1985 18374 77.6 19432 159.9 -1058 CBL 
1986 21153 15.1 16773 -13.7 +4380 -
Source: Derived from administered questionnaire. 
Table A22: Ikeja local government: Internally generated revenue, statutory allocation ('000 
naira) and shares (%), 1980-1986 
Year IR IR/R FA FA/R SA SA/R 
1980 2797 23.6 6161 52.1 2870 24.3 
1981 890 14.9 3619 60.7 1454 24.4 
1982 2659 31.1 4551 53.2 1337 15.7 
1983 2887 28.8 3997 40.0 3140 31.3 
1984 5284 51.1 4964 48.0 96 0.9 
1985 7734 42.1 5648 30.7 4992 27.2 
1986 8178 38.7 7671 36.3 5304 25.1 
Source: See Table A1. 
Notes: See Table A2. 
Table A23: Okpebho local government: Revenue, expenditure and their growth, ('000 
naira) 1980-1986 
Year Revenue % Expenditure % Surp./def. Fin. 
1980 1120 _ 1462 -342 NA 
1981 2064 84.3 1864 27.5 +200 — 
1982 2471 19.7 2459 31.9 +12 — 
1983 2160 -12.6 1952 -20.6 +208 — 
1984 3834 77.5 2195 12.4 +1639 
1985 3678 -4.1 2940 33.9 + 739 
1986 3314 -9.9 3416 16.2 -102 CBL 
Source: Derived from questionnaire 
Notes: See Table A1. 
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Table A24: Ejlgbo local government: Revenue and expenditure and their growth, ('000 
naira) 1980-1986 
Year Revenue % Expenditure % Surp/def. Fin. 
1980 363 421 -58 SG 
1981 671 84.8 532 26.4 +139 -
1982 788 17.4 286 -46.2 +502 -
1983 653 -17.1 416 45.4 +237 -
1984 517 -20.8 492 18.3 +25 -
1985 801 54.9 679 38.0 +122 -
1986 1041 29.9 762 12.2 +279 -
Table A33: Actual and estimated fiscal variables in selected local government areas (1980-
Table A25: Ijebu-North local government: Sources and composition of internally generated 
revenues ('000 naira) 1980-1991 
Year Taxes Rates Fines Licenses Fees Others 
1980 31 18 8 7 107 
1981 24 20 10 4 4 49 
1982 36 17 15 6 8 43 
1983 64 23 11 9 14 158 
1984 121 36 22 18 19 180 
1985 137 411 2 16 37 -
1986 97 226 292 10 1 260 
1987 91 206 303 3 - 41 
1988 - 134 351 435 9 30 
1989 114 272 653 27 3 181 
1990 118 318 550 72 63 1608 
1991 132 470 588 5 56 345 
Source: Derived from administered questionnaires. 
Table A26: Odeda local government: Sources and composition of internally generated 
revenues ('000 naira), 1980-1991 
Year Taxes Rates Fines Licenses Fees Others 
1980 _ 2 4 18 18 
1981 - 5 - 4 36 45 
1982 494 14 - 106 - -
1983 - 7 _ 10 72 38 
1984 - 38 - 31 181 36 
1985 - 516 - 10 438 35 
1986 - 75 3 57 432 14 
1987 - 78 3 70 272 11 
1988 - 71 - 54 431 33 
1989 - 62 1 41 445 143 
1990 77 2 113 514 12 
1991 82 2 142 581 218 
Source: Table A15. 
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Table A27: Calabar municipal government: Sources and composition of internally generated 
revenues ('000 naira) 1980-1991 
Year Taxes Rates Fines Licenses Fees Others 
1980 38 100 82 219 13 
1981 269 92 311 475 
1982 166 300 - 98 263 65 
1983 100 243 - 84 230 42 
1984 156 500 - 153 516 61 
1985 212 600 174 114 16 
1986 120 701 562 509 8 
1987 117 530 7 600 840 400 
1988 84 382 3 55 1 2272 
1989 119 216 - 22 — 868 
1990 67 187 2 38 2 988 
1991 69 310 9 48 - 2986 
Source: See Table A15. 
Table A28: Agaie local government: Sources and composition of internally generated 
revenues ('000 naira), 1980-1991 
Year Taxes Rates Fines Licences Fees Others 
1980 2 _ _ 14 4 
1981 3 2 - 15 6 — 
1982 13 - - _ 47 
1983 - 18 - 12 _ _ 
1984 42 61 - 12 — _ 
1985 157 18 - — _ 61 
1986 19 - - 27 57 19 
1987 8 24 84 - - 26 
1988 3 82 - 3 — 
1989 4 108 - 47 — 297 
1990 3 - 72 17 _ 
1991 4 204 - 34 - 3 
Source: See Table A15. 
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Table A29: Basa local government: Sources and composit ion of internally generated 
revenues ('000 naira), 1980-1991 
Year Taxes Rates Fines Licenses Fees Others 
1980 31 18 8 7 107 
1981 8 - - 20 19 73 
1982 - - - 17 15 71 
1983 - _ - 25 22 45 
1984 128 - - 50 47 168 
1985 330 - — 30 24 200 
1986 193 - 22 22 20 165 
1987 259 4 - 32 30 56 
1988 301 8 - 57 50 1085 
1989 307 15 - 38 37 277 
1990 252 1 - 68 67 311 
1991 293 2 - 82 81 305 
Source: See Table A15. 
Notes: Other sources include proceeds from stocks, shares and user-charges not properly specified. 
Table A30: Gusau local government: Sources and composition of internally generated 
revenues, ('000 naira), 1980-1991 
Year Taxes Rates Fines Licenses Fees Others 
1980 207 160 298 287 
1981 187 199 - 311 398 -
1982 190 - - 250 407 20 
1983 209 250 - 93 130 23 
1984 304 390 - 97 152 3 
1985 902 415 - 93 546 31 
1986 1594 428 - 92 404 12 
1987 1407 465 - 107 523 42 
1988 818 477 — 171 486 9 
1989 327 107 — 190 408 24 
1990 552 54 - 38 428 24 
1991 11 68 - 17 569 127 
Source: See Table A1S. 
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Table A31: Umuahia local government: Sources and composition of internally generated 
revenues ('000 naira), 1981-1991 
Year Taxes Rates Fines Licenses Fees Others 
1981 269 92 311 _ 475 
1982 130 245 338 - — 609 
1983 372 - 626 - - 3 
1984 208 428 434 - - 291 
1985 470 - 797 - - 14 
1986 170 342 748 - - 17 
1987 156 321 387 - - 404 
1988 154 301 404 - - 447 
1989 170 386 260 - - 429 
1990 201 531 - - - 596 
1991 224 427 532 - - 767 
Source: See Table A15. 
Table A32: Kaura Namoda local government: Sources and composition of internally 
generated revenues, ('000 naira), 1980-1991 
Year Taxes Rates Fines Licenses Fees Others 
1980 391 5 60 
1981 455 72 - 53 - -
1982 494 14 - 106 - -
1983 724 14 - 96 — -
1984 755 15 - 97 - -
1985 86 15 - 92 - -
1986 90 157 - 104 - -
1987 628 162 - 168 - -
1988 188 189 - 121 - -
1989 221 30 - 358 - -
1990 924 44 - 53 - -
1991 - - - - - -
Source: See Table A15, 
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Table A 3 3 : A c t u a l a n d e s t i m a t e d f iscal var iab les I n se lec ted local g o v e r n m e n t a r e a s (1980-
1991) 
Calabar: Internally generated revenue Expenditures 
Year Actual Estimates Diverg. Actual Est. Diverg. 
1980 452 864 52.3 1182 2162 54.7 
1981 610 713 85.5 1477 1783 82.8 
1982 892 692 129.0 1996 2206 90.5 
1983 699 503 139.0 1874 1482 126.4 
1984 1386 812 171.0 2429 2113 115.0 
1985 1116 2104 53.0 3567 4152 135.4 
1986 1900 2316 82.0 3567 4152 85.9 
1987 2494 1923 130.0 4749 3691 129.0 
1988 2797 3144 88.9 8586 9843 87.0 
1989 1225 3063 40.0 8057 10361 77.8 
1990 1284 2192 59.0 23384 28504 82.0 
1991 3422 3148 109.0 31201 35143 88.8 
Source: Estimated figures from budget address, various years. 
Iljebu-North: Internally generated revenue Expeditures 
Year Actual Estimate Diverg. Actual Est. Diverg. 
1980 66 1314 
1981 111 - - 1203 - -
1982 125 - - 1416 3163 45.0 
1983 279 - - 1587 3292 48.0 
1984 396 413 95.8 1318 - -
1985 603 630 95.7 2204 - -
1986 886 643 138.0 3155 - -
1987 644 816 79.0 3683 - -
1988 959 1031 93.0 11504 8061 142.7 
1989 1250 943 136.0 8727 7537 116.0 
1990 2729 3614 76.0 14827 18543 80.0 
1991 1596 - - 15072 14017 107.5 
Source: Estimates from Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Digest of Local Government Statistics, 
various issues, Abeokuta. 
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Table A34: Expenditure pattern in selected local governments ('000 naira)1980-1991 
Ijebu-North Odeda 
Year Current Capital Current Capital 
1980 526 788 627 288 
1981 203 1000 1155 480 
1982 316 1100 1424 807 
1983 682 905 1399 826 
1984 1016 302 1381 991 
1985 821 1383 951 1247 
1986 1162 1993 1029 2722 
1987 1669 2014 1577 2321 
1988 2425 9079 2187 4618 
1989 2789 5638 3057 4245 
1990 5593 9234 8655 5503 
1991 6728 8344 7443 14452 
Bida Agaie 
Year Current Capital Current Capital 
1980 3865 538 2000 246 
1981 6001 172 2512 581 
1982 2948 32 1894 235 
1983 2400 4 1833 39 
1984 5411 284 1403 -
1985 4710 74 1573 94 
1986 2637 226 1740 3 
1987 2614 - 1146 -
1988 3894 279 2127 124 
1989 9445 2773 2390 770 
1990 11215 9968 7811 1911 
1991 20203 6231 12979 1249 
Bassa Bichi 
Year Current Capital Current Capital 
1980 826 149 189 706 
1981 3510 163 669 427 
1982 2695 62 830 503 
1983 2244 114 712 308 
1984 2775 358 830 603 
1985 2896 567 946 702 
1986 3009 217 5455 1030 
1987 3814 1453 5946 1020 
1988 5498 2067 3553 3155 
1989 6432 1178 3988 3862 
1990 11124 4156 4905 4993 
1991 16662 1511 13779 5995 
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Calabar Kaura Namoda 
Year Current Capital Current Capital 
1980 1555 27 3169 2556 
1981 1472 5 5111 1209 
1982 1892 104 2448 942 
1983 1804 70 2709 68 
1984 2293 136 5665 246 
1985 2259 1456 4390 296 
1986 2819 748 6252 376 
1987 2559 2190 4495 1369 
1988 3270 5316 6328 2132 
1989 3853 4204 5182 2620 
1990 10047 13337 5559 3599 
1991 13993 17208 - -
Umuahia Gusau 
Year Current Capital Current Capital 
1980 4647 2318 
1981 1878 1921 4436 2344 
1982 2134 4590 5975 887 
1983 4324 2 5851 2523 
1984 6671 - 4506 -
1985 4590 513 3915 75 
1986 2531 39 2668 795 
1987 2996 648 3673 1104 
1988 11014 8422 8152 2318 
1989 6385 1932 4078 1492 
1990 6333 3317 4070 1449 
1991 6221 5141 10278 2410 
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